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[L, A. No. 20312. In Bank. July 1, 1948.1 
HARRIS STICKEL. Itespondent, v. SAN DIEGO ELEC-
TRIC RAILWAY COMPANY (a Corporation) et ai., 
Appellants. 
[1] Appeal-Review-lDcompetent Evidence.-OpiDion testimony 
given by a plaintiff without a motion having been made to 
strik(' it may be considered by an appellate court in support 
of a "erdict in his favor. 
[2] Automobile&-Appeal-Harmless Error-Instructions.-In an 
automobile collision case in which the employe's admission 
was l'eceived in evidence against him and his employer with-
out objection, the failure to give an instruction that the evi-
dence was not binding on the employer did not prejudice him 
where a finding of the operator's negligence was supported, 
since any negligence OD his part was imputed to the employer. 
[1] See 2 Oal.Jur. 804; 3 Am.Jur. 380. 
!ticK. Dig. References: [1] Appeal and Error, § 970; [2] Auto-
lIIouiles, ~a85-1; [3] Automobiles, §223; [4] Automobiles, 1258; 
15J Trial, §77(3); [6] Witnesses, 1222;'[7] Automobiles, 1202; 
[8] Witnesses, § 249; [9] Witnesses, § 91; [10] Appeal and Error, 
~ 1088; [11] Appeal and EITor, § 1612; (12] Negligence, § 188; 
11:i] 4'1ltomohiles, § 385-4; [14] Automobiles, § 385-14; [15] Auto-
' .. ohiles, § 327; [16] Automobiles, § 32'J-l; [17] Automobiles, 
~ 385-7; [18] Automobiles, § 318; [19] Automobiles, 1386-23; 
[20J New Trial, 1 169(3). I 
I 
i 
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[3] Id. - Evidence - Collisions - At Intersections.-In an action 
against a bus company and its employe arising out of an in-
tersection collision at ui/Z"ht, evidence that the car in which 
the plaintiff was riding stopped at the intersection before pro-
ceeding into it, that the bus driver sounded no warning and ! 
that he admitted that he did not see the other car until after 
it was struck, supported an inference that the driver's negli-
gent failure to watch for traffic crossing the street was the 
legal cause of the collisiol .. 
[4] Id. - Evidence-Contributory Negligence-Vehicles Crossing. 
-In an action arising out of a collision of a bus with an auto-
mobile at night, evidence that the automobile driver stopped 
at a through highway, looked to the right, shifted gears, and 
drove into the intersection; and that plaintiff, who was a 
passenger in the automobile, saw "bright lights in front of our 
cab and that is the last thing I remember" did not establish 
as a matter of law that the automobile driver failed to yield 
the right of way as required by Vch. Code, § 552, and that such 
negligence contributed to cause the accident. 
[6] Trial-Introduction of Evidence-01fer of Evidence.-In an 
automohile and bus collision case, the court properly refused 
to permit proof of intoxication of the passenger and driver of 
the automobile where defendants made a mere general offer of 
proof without producing a witness or stating the evidence 
whereby such intoxication was to be proved and without asking 
a question of any witness concerning such evidence. 
[6] Witnesses - Impeachment - Use of Assumed Name.-Where 
there is no real dispute as to the identity or true name of a 
plaintiff, evidence is inadmissible to show that he had used 
other names and had been arrested on various charges and 
convicted of misdemeanors under such names. 
[7] Autom~biles-Evidence-Admissibility.-In an automobile col-
lision case, the trial court properly sustained an objection to 
evidence that a police officer at the scene of the accident en-
tered in his notebook the notation that an automobile rlln 
through a stop sign, since such a notation was but fin opinion 
of the officer arrived at from interviewing unidentified persons. 
[8J Witnesses - Impeachment - Inconsistent Statements.-In an 
automobile and bus collision ease, a notlltion made by an officer 
at the scene of the accident as to the cause of the accident 
was not admissible to impellcb his testimony as to an admis-
sion of the bus driver, wbere the notation was not a record 
of a statement by the driver. 
[9] Id,-Examination of Witnesses-Extent.-In a wJ'ongful dentn 
and personal injury action, defendants wel'e not improperly 
I 
/ 
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curtail~d in the examination of their wiLne!:>!:> where it appcarcd 
thllt, after the sustaining of objections to several leading IIUC:;-
tions and th(' striking of SOIll(, answers of the witness, defl'nd-
ants abandoned their line of inquiry and .. eased to elicit fur-
ther testimony from him. 
[10) Appeal- Persons Entitled to Allege Error - Estoppel. - A 
party cannot compluin of the admission of evidence where, at 
the time it was offered, he stated that he had no objection to 
its receipt. 
[11] ld.-Harmless Error-Exclusion of Evidence.-A party can-
not complain of the refusal to admit a statement to rehabili-
tate a witness where it is subsequently admitted at the instance 
of the opposite party, irrespective of the stated purpose of its 
admission. 
[12] Negligence - Instructions - Assumption as to Conduct of 
Others.-An instruction substantially to the effect that one 
may not continue to assume that the law is being observed 
after knowing or having an opportunity, by the exercise of 
reasonable care, to know that it is not being observed, is not 
subject to the objection that it might be misunderstood as 
imposing a duty to anticipate the negligence of others. 
[13] Automobiles-Appeal-Harmless Error-Instructions.-In an 
automobile collision cue, an instruction that "It is the duty 
of the driver or operator of any kind of vehicle using a public 
highway to exercise ordinary care at all times to avoid placing 
himself or others in danger and to avoid a collision," although 
.ubject to the criticism that it might be understood as imposing 
the absolute duty "to avoid a collision," was not ground for 
reversal where it was apparent from the verdict that the jury 
did not so understand it. 
(14] ld.-Appeal-Harmless Error - Instructions. - In an auto-
mobile collision ease, defendants were not prejudiced by 
the refusal of an instruction as to the negligence of plaintiff in 
riding with an intoxicated driver where plaintiff could not 
have been contributively negligent in riding with a driver who, 
as the jury impliedly found, was not legally responsible for 
causing the collision. 
[15] ld. - Instructions-Oonduct of Driven at IntersectioDS.-In 
an action arising out of a collision of vehicles at an intersec-
tion in a through highway, it. was proper to refuse an instruo-
~on that it was immaterial which vehicle entered the inter-
8Cction first, where the lI.e,ligence of the respective driven 
waa at issue. 
) 
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[16J Id.-Instructfons-Speed.··-In an automobile collision case, 
it WII~ pr"p!')' to r('fm-a' 1111 in~t I'II<'tioll that t.he lawful "pe('d 
limit fOT a vehif'le at th(' intersection Will! 25 mill's per hour 
unles!I "it has bN'n c1f'1lrl.v proverJ that such speed ... was 
greater than was reasonable or prudent for a person operating 
a vehicle ... at th(' time and place of th(' accident, having 
due regard for the traffic on, and the surface and width of the 
highway, and the fact that the street. . was an arterial, or 
through highway, but in no event at a speed which endangers 
the safety of persons or prop('rty." sinc!' lIuch instruction was 
an incomplete,-inisleading and grammatically peculiar attempt 
to atate the codified speed laws. (Veh. Code, §§ 510, 511, 513.) 
[17] Id. -Appeal-Harmless Error-Instructions-Speed.-In an 
action arit;ing out of a collision of vehicles at a street intersec-
tion, the failure to instruct as to prima facie speed limit at 
the intersection was Dot pre.iudicial to defendant where it did 
not app!'ar thnt the jury would have been aided in their de-
liberation or probably would have reaf'he: a diiIerem result 
if it had heen giv('n. 
[18] Id.-Instructions-Driving Whlle lntoxicated.-In an action 
arising out of a collision of' vehicles, it was proper to refuse 
an instruction as to the criminal responsibility of' an intoxi-
cated driver. 
[19J Id.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Instructions. - In an action 
arising out of a collisioIl of vehil')(,s. thl' failure to give an 
instruction specifically directed to drunken driving as negli-
gence did not in the circumstances prejudice defendants where 
the jury were adequately instructed in general terms as to 
negligence, contributory negli~(>nl'e and proximnt(' cause. 
[20] New Trial-AJlidavits-As to Misconduct of J1lI')'.-Affidavits 
in support of a motion for new trial on the ground of the mis-
conduct of the jury are insufficient where they are made on 
information and belief or where they concern a juror in an-
other ease who is not shown to be a juror in the present case. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San 
Diego County from a verdict, and from an order denying a 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Joe L. Shell, Judge. 
Judgment and order affirmerl; appeal from verdict dismissed. 
Action for damages for wrongful death and for personal 
injuries resulting from a collision of vehicles. Judgment for 
plaintiff affirmE'd. 
Huntington P. Bledsoe for Appellants. 
Edgar B. HervE'Y and Henry F. Walker for Respondent. 
) 
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SCH.A VER, .1.-·-Plailltiff Harris Stickel sued to recover 
damages for th., d,.ath of hi" wife and for his own personal 
injuries rCRulting from a collision betwccn a bus of defendant 
railway company driven by defendant Amos, its employe, 
and a piekup truck in whieh plaintiff was a passenger and 
whieh WIlS being driven by Mrs. Stickel. Defendants appt'al 
from a judgment pursuant to a jury verdict for plaintiff and 
from an order denying their motion for judgment notwith· 
standing the verdict. We have concluded that their many 
claims of error do not justify a reversal. 
The accident occurred at about 10 :40 p. m. at the intersec-
tion of Twelfth and K Streets in the city of San Diego. The 
bus was proceeding south 011 Twelfth Street. According to 
defendant Amos its speed was hetween 22 and 24 miles an 
hour. Mrs. Stickel was driving west on K Street. The fol-
lowing evidence supports the verdict: Mrs. Stickel stopped at 
the cast curb line of the intersection. looked to her right, 
shifted gears, and drove into the intersection. She did not 
look to her right again. The truck was nearly across the in-
tersection, traveling approximately 6 and Dot more than 12 
miles an hour, when Mr. Stickel, who had not been" paying 
much attention" to traffic, "looked around and there were 
bright lights in front of our cab and that is the last thing I 
remember"; Mrs. Stickel "must ha,'e seen it [the bus] be-
cause she tried to step on the gas." ([1] There was no motion 
to strike this opinion testimony of plaintiff; therefore it is 
to be considered in support of the verdict. 2 Cal.Jur. § 473, 
p. 804.) The bus driver sounded 110 warning. The left front 
of the bus struck the right door of the cab of the trucl!. The 
force of the impact was snch that the bus pllsherl the truck 
nearly 170 feet from the point of impact. Two police officers 
arrived at the scene of the accident about 10 minutes after the 
collision. Shortly thereafter Amos. the bus driver. told them 
that "he did not see the Chevrolet r plaintiff's pickup truck] 
at all until after he hit it .... until he felt the gl88S in his 
face." ([2] This admission b;v Amos was received in evi-
dcnce as against both defendants without objection. Defend-
ants' objection to other evidencp of Amos' admission, on the 
ground that it was "1H'llrsay," was "sustained as to the 
def~ndant . . . Railway Company and overruled as to the 
defendant Amos," but there was no request that the jury 
be instrnctecl that the evidpller was not binding on the rail-
way eomp:1ll.\'. In any event t he Jack of such instrllction 
sa c.2d ..... 
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coulu not hu\'c prejudicrrl ,lcfcndant company because the 
finding tllat Amos was n(>gli~!'nt Jnw;t be upheld, and any 
nceligencc of Amos is imputed to the rOll1pany.) 
[3] Tllc eviu('JlcC above sU1I1Jllari;::ed is sufficient to support 
lin inference that Amos' negligent failure to watch for traffic 
crossing Twelfth Strcet was the legal cause of the co1lil'ion. 
[4] It docs 11ot, as defend nuts urge, e~tablish as a matter of 
law that Mrs. Stickel negligently failed to yield the right of 
way as required by section 552 of the Yehicle Codc and that 
such neglip,encc contributed to cause the accident. Section 
552 provides, "The driVer of any vehicle which has stopped 
as required by this code at the entrnnce to a through highway 
shall yield the right of way to other vehicles which have en-
tered the intersection from the throug-h highway or which are 
approaching so closely on the through highway as to consti-
tute an immediate hazard, but said driver having so yielded 
Illay proceed and the drivers of all other vehicles approae~ing 
the intersection on the throu~h hir,hway shall yield the right 
of way to the vehicle so about to enter or cross the through 
highway." The jury could have decided that when Mrs. 
Stickel started across the interseetion she reasonably believed 
that the bus was not an immediate hazard. 
[5] Defendants introduced midcnce tending to show that 
both Mr. and Mrs. Stickel were intoxicated at the time of the 
accident. This evidence consists of t('stimony that the Stickels 
were in a barroom about half an hour before the accident, that 
Mrs. Stickel was then obviously intoxicated and Mr. Stickel 
was drinking, and that after the a('cincnt the odor of alcohol 
was on the breaths of Mr. and Mrs. Stickel. The evidence was 
introduced in support of the pleaded defenses that negligcnce 
of Mrs. Stickel proximatcly contributed to cause the acci-
dent and that plaintiff himself was negligent in riding with 
Mrs. Stickel when he knew or should have known that she 
was intoxicated and could not and would not drive with due 
care. Plaintiff testified on cross-examination that neither he 
nor his wife was in the above mentioned barroom on the day 
or night of the collision. He was not asked whether he or 
Mrs. Stickel was intoxicated or had bcen drinking prior to 
the accident. Defendants complain that the trial court re-
fused to permit them to introduce other evidence which, they 
claim, would have tended to show that plaintiff and his wife 
were intoxicated at. the time of the accident. In this respect, 
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of admissible evidence; after several colloquies as to the suf-
ficiency of defendants' vague offers of proof and the admissi-
bility of certain evidence which defendants suggested they 
wished to offer,· the trial court said, "1 am not convinced that 
the offer of proof, or the cross-examination indicated, is proper. 
. . . We will reserve that matter for argument"; and defend-
ants never again made an offer of proof, sought to argue. or 
asked a question of any witness concerning such evidence. ., A 
mere general offer of proof without producing the witness 
or stating the evidence whereby the fact in issue is to be 
·Such colloquies were in material part as follows: 
"Mr. Bledsoe [counsel for defendant]: .•. 1 want to refer to 
numerous arrests [of nlaintift'J, particularly in this City of drunkl.'nne~~ 
and drunk driving .. 
"The Court: If you are able to prove, or if you wish to make inquiry 
as to whether or not he bad been drinking shortly prior to this occur· 
renee, in an effort to establish his capacity for obsE'rvation at the time 
this took place, I would say yes, but whether he had been drinking a 
week before or had been arrested 50 times before for drunktmn~lI~, 
unless it is connected up with the physi('lll condition st the time of the 
occurrence, I don't think it is impeachment. 
"Mr. Bledsoe: He [plaintiff] says he was not drinking on this ni~ht 
and never drinks. [Plaintiff hila not so testified and was not therenfter 
asked whether he had been drinking on the nijht Of. the accident or 
whether he had ever drunk intoxicating liquor.j I can show what he 
says is not true. . .. 
"Mr. Hervey [counsel for plaintiff]: Whether he ever drinks or not 
does not mn ke any difference . 
.. The Court: I think that is correet. If you have authorities for any 
of thos!' contentions J want to hear them, but in the absE'nce of any 
Ruthority I am relying on my general ideas of materiality .... 
"Mr. Hervey: ... It is entirely immaterial whether he drank or not 
on Rn~· other occasiolls. . . . 
"[Thereupon the noon recess was taken. Thereafter the following 
colloquy was had: J 
"~Ir. Bledsoe: He say8 in thE' dE:'pollition that he does not drink. 
[There is no evidence to this effect in the record.) I would then have 
to ask him some questions, to lay a fonndation for impeachment, whiclJ 
WOlll~ be as to th,· number of times he has been arrested for drunk 
(lriving, disorderly (·onduet, and the fact that he does drink and ha~ 
hecn seen nightly in different hars in an intoxicated condition. I want 
to RRk the questionR hefoye the jury if they are proper ...• 
"The Court: You ('.an make your oft'er of proof now and we will 
d,-fer ruling on it unti! tomorrow .... 
":\1 f. Bledsoe r made and there was discussion as to offers of proof 
rOJlc·eruillg matters other than intoxication.) ..• 
"The Court: What about this offer to prove the use of intoxicants. 
:\lr. Hen'ev! 
"Mr. ITervey: I certainly oujeet to that ... I would prefer that 
YOllr. Honor di(1 not indicate in the record that your Honor woul<:l 
sustain Ull ohjection to something unless it has "een statec1 definitely 
What it i~ I!oin~ to be. .. If COllnsel will definitely state what he 
would asl; t-he witness then ) would Iik,- to siat,> any o!>j(,,-tiOllH 1 
might have and your Honor may then rule on it if your Honor sees 
) 
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proved, or, if the witness be present, without putting a ques-
tion to him in such form as to give opportunity for objection, 
is not correct trial procedure and it affords no ground for 
appeal. rCitations.]" (Douillard v. Woodd (1942), 20 Cal. 
2d 665,670 (128 P.2d 6].) 
[6] Defendants complain that •• The court refused to per-
mit the witness Stickel to be impeached in regard to his 
identity and to thE' date and fact of his marriage to deceaRed." 
But defendants do not claim that plaintiff is not thE' man 
who sustained the injury in question and their answer ad-
mits that at the time of the accident deceased was the wife 
fit, but I don't think counsel ought to simply expect your Honor to role 
on a proposition like this when eounsel makes a statement that be 
would attempt ... to prove that he drinks .... Counsel might ask 
thiA question of the witness: Had von been drinking that day or bad 
your wife been drinking that day-but if counsel :Deans J-y bis offer that 
he would seek to prove this man'8 habit of using ..ntoxicating liquors 
at other and unrelated times and oeeasions •... J would objet't on 
the ground that it is incompetent, irrelevant and immaterIal and upon 
the ground that it was an attempt to i.lJ:.peaeh the witness upon an 
immaterial matter. 
":M r. Bledsoe: The purpose in making the offer was to ahow . . . 
that prior to the date of the accident that plaintiff. Harris Stickel, and 
Essie Stickel. deceased, were addieted to t.he use of intoxicating liquors 
in exees! and ad been for some period of time prior thereto, for a period 
of years, and that 'he witness. when he states as hE' did in his deposition 
that be does not drink, is not telling the troth; that the use of intoxi-
cating liquors to tht enent the witnes!les I unidentified J would stllte 
would, of course, be material as to the habits. . 
"The Court: Then you wish to develop a continuous course of ex· 
cessive use of int.oxicating liquor' That is what ;'our final objeetive is' 
"Mr. Bledsoe: That is it ... 
.. The Court:. . You didn't ask hln [plamtifl') the impeaching 
question which might lay the foundation. 
"Mr. Bledsoe: t haven't asked anything. 
"The Court: Lt>t us hear eXRetly what you want to ask. 
II Mr. Bledsoe: I wRnt to ask him. first, does he drink at any time. 
If he indieated in the deposition • I don't drink very much, I take a 
beer o('.cRsioually' t am Rssuming that that is what he is going to 
testify to here. Then I would like to ask him a question to IllY the founda-
tion to impeach him, to call bartenders, and so forth, to say that what 
he testified to on the stand is not true. This is prior to the date of the 
aceid('nt, days before nnd month~ before. 1 also wi~h to ehow thllt on 
oecasiullE in e.ourt. he has been arrestE'd twice for drunk driving. onee 
for drunkf'nness. and once for dronk and disorderly conduct within-
since the year 1934-here in this city .... 
"Mr. Hervey: Well. we will object to any evidclIc.e of his beillg 
arrested for misdemeanors, and we would also object to any ... 
attempt to impeaeh bim on nn immaterial matter, whetber he on other 
unrelllted oceasions drank, wheth('r to excess or otherwise. 
,. Mr. Bledsoe: J might ~lIy that we would alsn offl'r "ddence that 
he pled [sic] guilty to thos(' ('hnrg('~ whieh were filed. 
"The Court: ... 1 am not eonviueed that the olIer of proof ••. is 
proper ... We will reserve that matter for argument." 
/ 
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of plaintiff. It is apparent from colloquies of defendants' 
counsel with the trial court and from their briefs that their 
asserted desjre to inquire into plaintiff's identity and the 
fact of his marriage was actually a desire to discredit plain-
tiff in an improper manner. Their real complaint is that they 
were not permitted to show that Stickel had used other names 
and bad been arrested on various charges and convicted of 
misdemeanors under such other names. Such evidence was 
not admissible. (People v. Arlington (1899), 123 Cal. 356, 
357 [55 P. 1003] ; People v. Mohr (1910), 157 Cal. 732, 734 
[109 P. 476) ; People v. Fleming (1913), 166 Cal. 357, 380 
[136 P. 291, Ann.Cas. 1915B 881] ; People v. Williams (1925), 
72 Cal.App. 52, 55 [236 P. 355]; People v. Adams (1926), 
76 Cal.App. 178, 184-185 [244 P. 106].) 
[7] On cross-examination of a police officer who had testi-
fied to the above mentioned admission of Amos that he did 
not see the pickup truck, defendants sougbt to show that at 
the scene of the accident the officer made in his notebook the 
notation, "Cause of accident: Auto ran througb stop sign." 
The trial court properly sustained an objection to sueh evi-
dence on the ground that the notation was but an opinion 
of the officer arrived at after be had interviewed unidentified 
persons at the scene of the accident. [8] Defendants now as-
sert that the notation was a record of a statement made by 
Amos and was, therefore, admissible to impeach the officer. 
The record does not support this assertion; on the contrary 
defendants' counsel stated to the trial court that by evidence of 
such notation "I want to show at the time, before Mr. Amos 
said anything, that he [the officer] put down the cause of the 
accident. " (Italics added.) 
[9] Defendants asscrt that they were improperly curtailed 
in their examination of their witness Lindamood. The record 
reveals that after objections to several leading questions had 
been sustained and several answers of the witness which were 
not responsive or not statements of fact had been stricken, 
defendants abandoned the line of inquiry which they now 
claim was foreclosed by the court. Defendants ceased their 
attempts to elicit the testimony even though plaintiff's counsel 
stated that he had no objection thereto. 
{10] Defendants complain both because a written state-
ment of Linuamood, made three days before the trial, was 
llo1 received in evidence when ofl'ered by defendants for the 
purpose (not stated to the trial court) of rehabilitating Lin-
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damood after his cross-examination and because such state-
ment was subsequently received when it was offered by plain-
tiff "for impeachment." The statement has no impeaching 
effect (see Froeming v. Stockton Electric R. R. Co. (1915), 
171 Cal. 401, 408-411 [153 P. 712, Ann.Cas. 1918B 408]). 
But defendants have no ground to complain of its admis-
sion since their counsel said, when it was offered by plaintiff, 
that he had no objection to its receipt. [11] And defendants 
have no ground to complain of the original refusal to admit 
the statement, because its rehabilitory effect, if any, was the 
same whatever the stated purpose for which it was offered in 
evidence by plaintiff. 
Defendants assert that the trial court, over objection, per-
mitted plaintiff's counsel deliberately to misread a question 
and answer from a deposition of defendant Amos during his 
cross-examination of Amos and refused to permit Amos to 
explain "discrepancies" between such answer in the deposi-
tion and his testimony at the trial. The record shows that 
plaintiff's counsel correctly read the question and answer, 
that there were no "discrepancies" between the answer as 
read and Amos' testimony, and that explanation of the answer 
was made on Amos' redirect examination. 
[12] Defendants contend that the italicized portions of 
the following instruction are erroneous: "A person who, 
himself, is exercising ordinary care, has a right to assume 
that others, too. will perform their duty under the law, and 
he has a further right to rely and act on that assumption. 
Thus, it is not negligence for such a person to fail to antici-
pate injury which can come to him only from a violation 
of law or duty by another. However, an exception should be 
noied: The rights just d(>filled do not exist when it is reasonably 
apparent to one, or in the exercise. of ordinary care would be 
apparent to him, that another is not going to perform his duty. 
[One is not justified in ignoring obvious danger although it is 
created by another's miscolluuct, nor is he ever excused from 
exercising ordinary care.]" (Cal. Jury Instructions, Civil 
[B.A.J.L, 1943 ed.], Instruction 138. Italics defendants'.) 
According to defendants. thp italicized portions of the in-
struction might be misunderstood to impose a duty to antici-
pate negligence on the part of others. The so-called "excep-
tion" does not impose snrh a duty. It is but a statement as 
to that common type of negli:,!'(>nce, the unreasonable failure 
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g<'nce of others. "One may not continue to assume that the 
law is being observed after knowing or haying an opportu-
nity, by the u;;e of rcasonabl<.' ('are, to know that it is not being 
observed." (Edlund v. Los Angeles Ry. Co. (1936), 14 Cal. 
App.2d 673,675 [58 P.2d 928].) 
[13] Defendants further complain of an instruction that 
"It is the duty of the driver or operator of any kind of vehicle 
using a public highway to exercise ordinary care at all times 
to avoid placing himself or others in danger and to avoid Ii 
collision." (Cal. Jury Instructions, Civil [B.A.J .1., 1943 ed.], 
InstructIOn 13S-A.) They argue that the instruction might 
he misunderstood to impose the absolute duty "to avoid a 
collision"; that the jury might believe that the qualifying 
words, "to exercise ordinary care," relate only to the duty 
"to avoid placing himself or others in danger" and not to 
the duty "to avoid a collision." The instruction is subject to 
such possible construction and, therefore, to criticism. (See 
.Anderson v. Freis (1943), 61 Cal.App.2d 159, 164-165 [142 
P.2d 330].) However, the jury did not so understand it for by 
their yerdict for plaintiff (who, they were instructed, could not 
recover if they found that Mrs. Stickel was negligent and that 
such negligence contributed to cause the collision) they im-
pliedly found that. although Mrs. Stickel did not "avoid a 
collision," she was not guilty of negligence proximately con-
tributing to canse snch collision. 
[14] The court refused an instruction, proposed by de-
fendants, to the effect that if Mrs. Stickel was intoxicated 
Ilnd such intoxication was a proximate cause of the accident, 
and plaintiff knew or should have known of such intoxication, 
then his riding with her constituted negligence, and he can-
not recover. Defendants complain that the refusal of this in-
struction deprived them of consideration of their pleaded 
affirmative defense that plaintiff was himself contributively 
negligent. But the refusal could not have prejudiced defend-
ants. Plaintiff could not have been found contributively neg-
ligent in riding with a driver who, as the jury impliedly found 
(since, having been instructed that negligence of Mrs. Stickel 
was imputed to plaintiff, they found for plaintiff), was not 
herself le~ally responsible for causing sHch collision. 
[15] Deft'Duauts complain becaw~l: the trial court refused 
to give tbe following instructioll requesteu by them: "It is 
immaterial ",hi('11 vehiele ('uters the inter::;ection first. The 
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.erence or is given no right of way over a vehiclc traveling 
on a through highway merely becausc the vehicle crossing 
or entering tlw through highway might have entered the in-
tersection first." The first sentencc of the proposed instruc-
tion, standing alone, is manifestly erroneous. The relative 
positions of the vehicles before they collided are of course 
material where the negligence of the respective drivers is in 
issue. The jury were correctly instructed as to the respective 
rights and duties of drivers traveling on and across a through 
highway; it was not suggested that one crossing such a high-
way might have the right of way "merely because ... [he] 
might have entered the intersection first" ; and the trial court 
correctly refused to distract the jury by giving the unneces-
sary instruction. 
[16] The trial court refused the following instruction pro-
posed by defendants: ., The lawful speed limit for a bus or 
vehicle traveling south on 12th Street at the place where it 
intersects with • K' Street is and was at the time of the acci-
dent 25 miles per hour, unless, it has been clearly proven 
that such speed of 25 miles per hour was greater than was 
reasonable or prudent for a person operating a vehicle on 
12th Street in a southerly direction at the time and place of 
the accident, having due regard for the traffic on, and the 
surface and width of the highway, and the fact that 12th 
Street at the time and pla<:e of the accident was an arterial, 
or through highway, but in no event at a speed which en-
dangers the safety of persons or property." This instruction 
is an incomplete, misleading, and grammatically peculiar 
attempt to state the codified speed laws which applied to the 
bus. (Veh. Code, § 510 [basic speed law], § 511 [prima facie 
speed limits], § 513 [proof of speed in excess of prima facie 
limit does not establish negligence as a matter of law].) 
[17] Defendants argue that they were prejudiced because the 
jury were not told of the speed limit of 25 miles an hour. But 
25 miles an hour was the "prima facie'" not, as stated in 
the proposed instruction, the "lawful" speed limit. Nor does 
it appear that the jury would have been aided in their delib· 
eration or probably would have reached n different result if 
the trial court had corrected the instruction and informed 
them of the "prima facie" speed limit, for whether defendant 
Amos was or was not exceeding such limit would not, under 
the circumstances ~own, answer the question whether he was 
negligent. 
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[18] Defendants nrgt' that the Irial (~()urt erred in refus-
ing the following requ(>sted instruction: .. Section 501 of the 
Vehie1e Code ... read, in part, as follows: 'Any person wbo. 
while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, drives a 
vehicle and when so driving does any act forbidden by law 
or neglects any duty imposed by law in the driving of such 
vehicle, which act or neglect proximately causes bodily injury 
to any person, is guilty of a felony.' 
"Section 502 of the Vehicle Code . . . read, in part, as fol-
lows: 'It is unlawful for any person who is under the inftuence 
of intoxicating liquor to drive a vehicle upon any highway.' 
"If you should find from the evidence that the decedent, 
Essie Stickel, conducted herself in violation of Section 501 
or 502 of the Vehicle Code ... , you are instructed that such 
conduct constituted negligence as a matter of law, and if you 
further find that such violation of law by Essi(> Stickel con-
tributed in some degree as a proximate cause of the accident, 
the plaintiffs cannot recover and your verdict must be for the 
defendants. " 
The refusal to instruct as to the criminal responsibility 
of an intoxicated driver was correct. (See Greening v. Ford 
(1932),127 Cal.App. 462 (16 P.2d 143], where, after injection 
into a civil action of the question of criminal responsibility, 
the jury brought in a verdict of .. for the defendant Not 
Guilty"; on this ground a new trial was granted.) [19] An 
instruction specifically directed to drunken driving as negli-
gence could have been given but, in the circumstances, the 
failure of the court to modify and give defendants' proposed 
instruction does not appear to have prejudiced them. The 
jury were adequately instructed in general terms as to neg-
ligence, contributory negligence and proximate cause. To 
assume that they did not consider the question of Mrs. Stick-
el's asserted intoxication under these general instructions 
would be to attribute to the jury a lack of ordinary intelli-
gence or deliberate violation of duty. 
Defendants are mistaken in their assertion that other in-
structions requested by them are not fully covered by the 
instructions given. 
Defendants assert that the manner in which plaintiff's 
counsel cross-examined certain of defendants' witnesses 
amounted to prejudicial misconduct. Surh cross·examination 
was searching and even rigorous but we cannot agree tha\ 
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it was conducted in a manner which prejudiced defendants' 
substantial rights. 
[20] On motion for new trial defendants presented three 
affidavits which, they claim, show misconduct on the part of 
two jurors; i. e., that such jurors made certain personal in-
vestigations which influenced the verdict. Two of the affi-
davits, by an employe of defendant company whose capacity 
is not averred. are upon information and belief. The third, 
by a bus operator of defendant company, concerns the con-
duct of "a gray-haired woman of about fifty years of age 
wearing a gray suit and hat [who] informed affiant that she 
was a juror then hearing a 'death case' "; it is not shown that 
this woman wa.-; a juror in the present case. Therefore. the 
affidavitR were insufficif'llt for thf' purpose for which they 
were offered. (People v. Pindley (1901), 132 Csl. 301, 308 
[64 P. 472] ; Gay v. Torrance (1904),145 Cal. 144,152 [78 P. 
540] ; Kimic v. San .lose-Los Gatos etc. Ry. Co. (1909), 156 
Cal. 379, 396 [104 P. 986].) 
Dl·fendants' contention that the evidence shows an amount 
of damages less than that awardcd for medical expenses. 
etc .• cannot be considered since they stipulated "that defend-
ants will present no question on said appcal concerning the 
amount or the excessiveness of the damages." 
For the reasons above stated the judgment and order 
appealed from are affirmed. Defendants' purported appeal 
from the verdict is dismissed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., and Spence, 
J., concurred. 
TRA YNOR, J .-1 dissent. 
In my opinion the "erdict is not supported by the evidence. 
The bus driver proceeding on a through highway had the 
right to assume that Mrs. Stickel would yield the right of 
way. (Veh. Code. § 552; Ambra v. Woolsey, 55 Cal.App.2d 
104. lOG [130 P.2d 152); Zwcr·in v. Riverside Cement Co., 
52 Cal. A pp2d 715. 7]8-719 [126 P.2d 920]; Gritsclt v. Pick-
u,iclo Stages System, 131 Cal.App. 774. 780 122 P.2d 554]; 
ll1lJlI!JI' v. McCall. 35 Cal.App.2d 634. (i3S Inn P.2d aSGI; 
Ril,'(/ \". ill arkef Streff R.I!. Co .• 50 Cal.App.2d 79(i. 800 1123 
P.2d 904); s~e LindrlliJall"lll v. 8m'hour, 2]3 Cal. 277. 285-
28{j 12 P.2d ]61]). I find nothill!(" in the evi(l('JH'1' from wldeh 
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to the intersection as to constitute an immediate hazard and 
therefore cannot agree that Mrs. Stickel could rcasonably 
believe that there was not such a hazard. 
Even if it is assumed that the jury could determine that 
the bus driver was negligent when he entered the intersection, 
Mrs. Stickel was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter 
of law, if she was under the influence of intoxicating liquor 
while driving the t.ruck, and the trial court's refusal to give 
defendants' instruction to that. effect was prejudicial error. 
Defendants called several witnesses, who testified that Mr. 
and Mrs. Stickel were intoxicated on the evening of the colli-
sion, which occurred at about 10 :40 p. m. Harry Walker 
testified that he was on duty as bartender at the Last 
R-oundup Cafe at Encanto on that evening; that the Stickels 
entered the bar sometime between 9 and 10 p. m.; that they 
came directly to the bar and asked for a drink; that Mrs. 
Stickel "was hilarious and in a happy fralDe of mind and a 
little bit on the staggering side"; that he therefore refused 
to serve her liquor aud instructed the waitresses not to serve 
her; that Mrs. Stickel said "she would get a drink anyway" 
and mingled with other custolDers; and that the Stickels )('ft 
the bar 20 or 30 minutes after their arrival. Leon Cesmat 
testified that he was employed at the Last Roundup Cafe and 
that his duties included keeping order in the cafe; that on 
the night of the accident between 9 and 10 p. m. he saw Mrs. 
Stickel in the cafe talking to two sailors; that Mrs. Stickel 
was "pretty well intoxicated" and that he ordered her out 
upon instructions of the proprietress. Sandra Slayton testi-
fied that she was part owner and manager of the Last Roundup 
Cafe; that on the night of the accident she saw the Stickels 
at the cafe shortly before 10 p. m.; that Mrs. Stickel was 
intoxicated; that Mr. Stickel's condition "wasn't 80 bad"; 
that Mrs. Stickel "was walking from table to table picking 
up drinks and drinking them"; that Mrs. Stickel did not 
lcaye the cafe when the witness asked her to and that she 
therefore asked the doorman to make her leave. George F. 
Evans testified that he went with an ambulance to the scene 
of the accident in line of duty as a police officer; that there 
was a slight odor of alcohol at the scene of the accident, and 
a more noticeable one in the ambulance; and that he smelled 
alcobol on Mrs. Stickel's breath. Harry Kemp, another police 
officer, testified that he drove the ambulance to the hospital 
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carry them out of the ambulance and at that time smelled 
alcohol on both of them. 
'fhe trial court refused to give the following instruction 
requested by defendants: 
"Section 501 of the Vehicle Code of the State of California 
in force and effect at the time of the accident reads, in part, 
as follows: 'Any person who, while under the influence of 
intoxicating liquor, drives a vehicle and when so driving does 
any act forbidden by law or neglets any duty imposed by law 
in the driving of such vehicle, which act or neglect proxi-
mately causes bodily injury to any person, is guilty of a fel-
ony . . .' Section 502 of the Vehicle Code of the State of 
California in force and effect at the time of the accident reads, 
in part, as follows: 'It is unlawful for any person who is under 
the influence of intoxicating liquor to drive a vehicle upon 
any highway.' If you should find from the evidence that the 
decedent, Essie Stickel, conducted herself in violation of Sec-
tion 501 or 502 of the Vehicle Code of the State of California, 
just read to you, you are instructed that such conduct consti-
tuted negligence as a matter of law, and if you further find 
that such violation of law by Essie Stickel contributed in 
some degree as a proximate cause to the accident, the plaintiffs 
cannot recover and your verdict must be for the defendant,s.". 
The majority opinion holds that the failure to give this 
instruction could not have prejudiced defendants, on the 
grounds that the jury were adequately instructed in general 
terms as to negligence, contributory negligence, and proximate 
cause, and that they impliedly found that Mrs. Stickel was 
not legally responsible for causing the collision. "To assume 
that they did not consider the question of Mrs. Stickel's 
asserted intoxication under these general instructions would 
be to attribute to the jury a lack of ordinary intelligence or 
deliberate violation of duty." 
Although the jury may have considered the question of Mrs. 
Stickel's alleged intoxication, they were not instructed as to 
the legal effect of such intoxication on her responsibility for 
the accident. The genera] instructions left them free to formu-
·Section 501 is violated by anyone who engages in negligent conduct 
in addition to driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of 
intoxicating liquor, but such driving is in itself a volo.tion of section 502. 
Reference to section 501 was therefore superfluous, but it WtLS 1I0t 
erroneous. If the jury had found that Mrs. Stickel violated section 
502, they would necessarily have deternlined that plaintiffs could not 
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late their own stanJunl of (·nJIIII ... , and to approve' "01111111'1 I hill 
the Legislature has declared xo IlHzHrdous as to "all f()J" I'rill1i-
nal punishment. 'I'hey were bounJ to concluul' from these 
instructions that Mrx. Sti,:kcl's alleged intoxication was only 
one circumstance to be consiuered ill determining whether her 
conduct contributed to the injuries complaineu of. In the 
absence of a statute like section 502 such instructions might 
haye been adequate. (Coakley v. Ajuria, 209 Cal. 745, 752 
l290 P. 33] ; Emery v. Los Angeles Ry. Co., 61 Cal.App.2d 
455.461 [143 P.2d 112] ; see 4 Sherman & Redfield on Negli-
gence (rev. -ed.), § 700.) Section 502, however, prohibits 
persolls from engaging in the ultrahazardous activity of driv-
ing a motor vehicle on a highway while under the influence of 
intoxicating liquor, thereby setting a statutory standard of 
conduct. If that standard is applicable, a violation thereof 
constitutes negligence as a matter of law. "An act or failure 
to act below the statutory standard is negligence per se, or 
negligence as a matter of law." (Satterlee v. Orange Glenn 
School Dlstrict,t 29 Cal.2d 581, 588 [177 P.2d 279], and cases 
there cited.) In determining whether the statutory standard 
is applicable, the court must determine whether the persons 
injured were within a class that the statute was designeJ to 
protect, and whether the injury arose from a hazard of the 
kind the statute was designed to guard against. (De Haen v. 
Rocl.:wood Sprinkler Co., 258 N.Y. 350 [179 N.E. 764] ; Re-
statement, Torts, § 286; Prosser, Torts, 269.) 
Mr. and Mrs. Stickel as users of the highway were clearly 
within the class of persons for whose protection section 502 
of the Vehicle Code was enacted. It is likewise clear that their 
injuries arose from a type of hazard against which the statute 
is directed. In Johnston v. Brewer, 40 Cal.App.2d 583, 587 
[105 P.2d 365]. it was held that the jury was correctly in-
structed that a pedestrian, who was struck by an automobile, 
.. was guilty of negligence as a matter of law" in being on a 
street or highway while intoxicated in violation of a municipal 
ordinance. "It is common knowledge that one whose senses 
have been dulled by intoxicants is Ullable to control his bodily 
movements in a normal manner and as a result the presence 
t.The lIohling in the majority opinion in that ease that the jury can 
determine from the evidence whetller deviation from a statutory stand 
ard ill excused hy the extraordinary circumstances of a particular case 
is not involved in the present case. 'fllere is no evidence of any justi· 
fication for Mrs Stickel's driving the autolllouile while under til .. 




174 STICKEL 1). SAN DIEOO ELEc. Ry. 00. [32 C.2d 
of such persons upon the public stre('ts and highways is danger. 
ous not only to themst'lves but to others who are lawfully using 
the strcets and highways. It is evidrnt that the ordinan('(' was 
enacted in the interests of the gelleral welfare for the dual 
purpose of protecting intoxicated persons from the results 
of their own folly and of protecting the general public from 
the dangers alld other evils attenuant upon the presence of 
such persons upon tIle streets and highways ... " Certainly 
the statute involved in this case has the same purpose, for the 
dangers attendant upon the presence of an intoxicated person 
on a highway, particularly at an intersection, are multiplied if 
he is operating a motor vehicle. (Packard v. O'Neil, 45 Idaho 
427 [262 P. 881, 56 A.L.R. 317] ; Wise v. Schneider, 205 Ala. 
537 [88 So. 662J; Lincoln Taxl:cab Co. v. Smith, 88 Misc. 9 
[150 N.Y.S. 86].) 
Section 502, however, does not deprive an intoxicated driver 
of all protection against the wrongful act of another. If the 
disabilities of the driver arising from intoxication, such as 
impairment of his percepton and his reactions to the dangers 
of th(' road, did not expose him to a foreseeable risk of injury 
through such a wrongful act, section 502 does not govern 
llis civil responsibilities. Certainly in the present case, if Mrs. 
Stickel was intoxicated, the consequent impairment of her drh·· 
ing ability exposed her to a foreseeable risk of injury throu{Ch 
the negligence of defcndants' bus driver. It cannot reasonably 
be said that the possibility that other vehicles approaching 
011 the through highway would negligently enter the inter-
section was so remote that it could not be regarded as part of 
the risk. Anyone operating a motor vehicle on a highway 
must realize that he cannot drive blindly into an intersection 
in the confidence that other vehicles will yield the right of 
way. (Donat v. Dillon, 192 Cal. 426, 429 (221 P. 193] ; see 
Prosser, Torts, 245 and cases there cited.) Clearly, if Mrs. 
Stickel was intoxicated, her belief as to the chances she could 
take cannot serve to jnstify her conduct. Whatever the ex-
tent of the right of a driver of a motor vehicle to assume that 
others will use due care, an intoxicated driver, who has im-
paired his ability to appreciate the dangers of the road, 
particularly of an intersection, is engaged in an ultrahazard-
ous activity that necessarily involves a risk of serious harm 
to himself as well as well as to others. A motor vehicle 
operated by an intoxicated person is an instrument of death 
and destruction, and it iR a matter of chance wIlen or whetller 
an accident. will occur a11d to whom, and how serious it will be. 
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Even if momentarily the operator's reactions are those of a 
sober person, he is likely to revert to the erratic reactions of 
those who are not. His momentary seizure of sober behaviour 
may in itself be erratic and is certainly dangerous in lulling 
others into believing that he has full possession of his senses. 
Conduct involving undue risk of harm to one's self as well 
as to others, including conduct prohibited by statute, consti-
tutes contributory negligence. (Meincke v. Oakland Garage, 
Inc., 11 Ca1.2d 255, 256 [79 P.2d 91] ; Koeppel v. Daluiso, 118 
Cal.App. 442, 446 [5 P.2d 457]; see Restatement, Torts, 
§§ 469, 475.) 
It is contended, however, that the judgment must be affirmed 
on the ground that the jury has impliedly found that Mrs. 
Stickel was not legally responsible for causing the collision, in 
other words, that her conduct was not a "proximate" cause 
thereof. This contention may mean (1) that Mrs. Stickel's 
conduct was not in fact a cause of the collision, or (2) that the 
harm therefrom does not fall within the limits of her legal 
responsibility for the consequenccs of her conduct. That her 
driving the truck into the intersection was a substantial factor 
in bringing about the collision and therefore in fact con-
tributed to the accident there can be no doubt. (See Restate-
ment, Torts, § 431.) With that dctermined, the question of 
causation is settled. It remains only to dctermine whether the 
injury falls within the limits of her responsibility for the con-
sequences of her conduct. (See Prosser, Torts, pp. 311-313.) 
In my opinion. that determination is made once it is estab-
lished that her conduct was wrongful with respect to her own 
safety and that of ot.hers on the highway; for the risk reason-
ably to be foreseen not only creates the responsibility but 
defines its limits. (See concurring opinion in Mosley v. Ar-
drn li'arms Co., 26 Ca1.2d 213, 220 [157 P.2d 372, 158 A.L.R. 
8721, and authorities there cited.) A decision. therefore, that 
Mrs. Stickel was not legally responsible for causing the colli-
sion or that her conduct was not the proximate cause thereof 
meAns only that she was not negligent. If she was driying while 
intoxicated. she was guilty of negligence as a matter of law, 
and thc jury should have been so instructed. 
Allprllants' petition for a rf'hl'aring was dl'nied July 29, 
1948. a11<l opinion was modified to read as above. Trayuor, J., 
voted for a rehearing. 
